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Abstract: Since the end of the Second World War and the subsequent success of 
constitutional judicial review, one particular model of constitutional rights has had remarkable 
success, first in Europe and now globally. This global model of constitutional rights is 
characterized by an extremely broad approach to the scope of rights (sometimes referred to as 
'rights inflation'), the acceptance of horizontal effect of rights, positive obligations, and 
increasingly also socio-economic rights, and the use of the doctrines of balancing and 
proportionality to determine the permissible limitations of rights.  
Drawing on analyses of a broad range of cases from the UK, the European Court of 
Human Rights, Germany, Canada, the US, and South Africa, the book provides the first 
substantive moral, reconstructive theory of the global model. It shows that it is based on a 
coherent conception of constitutional rights which connects to attractive accounts of judicial 
review, democracy and the separation of powers.  
The first part of the book develops a theory of the scope of rights under the global 
model. It defends the idea of a general right to personal autonomy: a right to everything which, 
according to the agent's self-conception, is in his or her interest. The function of this right is to 
acknowledge that every act by a public authority which places a burden on a person's 
autonomy requires justification. The second part of the book proposes a theory of the 
structure of this justification which offers original and useful accounts of the important 
doctrines of balancing and proportionality. 
The introductory chapter gives an overview of the project of the book and identifies the 
existence of the global model of constitutional rights. It then explains the terminology – in 
particular the use of the terms ‘constitutional’ and ‘global’ –, the reconstructive methodology, 
and addresses the question of whether the US tradition of constitutional rights law forms part 
of the global model. It concludes by providing a summary of the book’s main claims.  
 
 
                                                     
* Lecturer in Law, London School of Economics and Political Science. This is the introductory chapter of 
my book The Global Model of Constitutional Rights (OUP 2012). 
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The Global Model of Constitutional Rights
i. the project
Since the end of the Second World War and the subsequent success of
constitutional judicial review, one particular model of constitutional
rights has had remarkable success, first in Europe and now globally. In
a nutshell, this global model of constitutional rights sees rights as protecting
an extremely broad range of interests but at the same time limitable by
recourse to a balancing or proportionality approach. Thus, it places itself
in sharp contrast to the conceptions of rights proposed by most if not all
moral and political philosophers who agree that rights protect only a
limited set of especially important interests while enjoying a special,
heightened, normative force. However, while the global model of con-
stitutional rights does not seem to sit well with the philosophical con-
ceptions of rights that have been proposed to date, it has itself still not
been sufficiently theorized. The important and interrelated questions
which it raises are the following. (1) Which theory or conception of rights
explains best the global model of constitutional rights, including the
questions of which values are protected by rights and what are their
limits? (2) How does the judicial enforcement of this particular conception
of constitutional rights relate to the value of democracy? (3) How does
it relate to the value of the separation of powers, in particular to consider-
ations of the relative institutional competence of courts on the one hand
and the elected branches on the other? A comprehensive theory of
constitutional rights must provide an integrated answer to these ques-
tions: the theory of rights which it proposes must also reflect attractive
conceptions of democracy and the separation of powers. This book
presents such a theory.
Its main features are the following. (1) The theory follows a substantive
moral approach in that it is grounded in political morality; this can be
contrasted with a formal theory such as Robert Alexy’s influential theory
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of rights as principles or optimization requirements.1 (2) It is reconstructive,
i.e. it is a theory of the actual practice of constitutional rights law around
theworld. I will explain this in detail below. (3) It is general in that it does not
focus on specific issues or rights but aims at identifying features of their
moral structure which are shared by many or all constitutional rights.
ii. the global model and the dominant narrative
This section will introduce the four central features of the global model of
constitutional rights; and it will do so by contrasting themwith what I shall
call the dominant narrative of the philosophy of fundamental rights. The
dominant narrative holds (1) that rights cover only a limited domain by
protecting only certain especially important interests of individuals; (2) that
rights impose exclusively or primarily negative obligations on the state; (3)
that rights operate only between a citizen and his government, not between
private citizens; and (4) that rights enjoy a special normative force, which
means that they can be outweighed, if at all, only under exceptional
circumstances. Of these features of the dominant narrative, the general
acceptance of the second—rights as imposing negative obligations on the
state—has already eroded considerably, mainly because of the growing
recognition of social and economic rights.2 The third—limitation to the
relationship between citizen and government—while generally held to
be true, does not normally attract much attention from rights theorists.
The first and the fourth—special importance and special normative force—
are still hardly controversial. However, under the global model of consti-
tutional rights all four elements of this narrative have been given up—and
often a long time ago. The doctrines and developments in constitutional
rights law which have led to their erosion are rights inflation, positive
obligations and socio-economic rights, horizontal effect, and balancing
and proportionality. These doctrines and developments form the core of
the global model of constitutional rights and provide the basic materials
out of which the following chapters will reconstruct the theory of rights
proposed here.
1 Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Oxford University Press, 2002). My essay ‘Balancing and the
Structure of Constitutional Rights’, (2007) 5 International Journal of Constitutional Law 453 criticizes Alexy’s
formal approach and recommends a substantive moral one; this book, by providing such a substantive
moral theory of rights, can thus be read as offering a constructive response to what I regard as
deficiencies in Alexy’s methodology. For a generally positive review of Alexy’s book see Kumm,
‘Constitutional Rights as Principles: On the Structure and Domain of Constitutional Justice’, (2004) 2
International Journal of Constitutional Law 574.
2 For a theoretical account of this development, see Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights
and Positive Duties (Oxford University Press, 2008), ch. 1.
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1. Rights inflation
Constitutional rights are no longer seen as only protecting certain particu-
larly important interests. Especially in Europe a development has been
observed which is sometimes pejoratively called ‘rights inflation’,3 a name
which I shall use in a neutral sense as referring to the increasing protection
of relatively trivial interests as (prima facie) rights. The European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR) routinely reads such interests into the right to
private life (Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights
[ECHR]). For example, in the famous Hatton case, which concerned a
policy scheme which permitted night flights at Heathrow airport, thus
leading to noise pollution which disturbed the sleep of some of the
residents living in the area, the Court discovered as part of Article 8 the
right not to be ‘directly and seriously affected by noise or other pollution’,4
dismissively dubbed ‘the human right to sleepwell’ byGeorge Letsas.5 The
broad understanding the Court takes towards the issue of private life
becomes clear in one of its more recent attempts to circumscribe it:
The Court recalls that the concept of ‘private life’ is a broad term not
susceptible to exhaustive definition. It covers the physical and psycho-
logical integrity of a person. It can therefore embrace multiple aspects of
the person’s physical and social identity. Elements such as, for example,
gender identification, name and sexual orientation and sexual life fall
within the personal sphere protected by Art. 8. Beyond a person’s
name, his or her private and family life may include other means of
personal identification and of linking to a family. Information about the
person’s health is an important element of private life. The Court further-
more considers that an individual’s ethnic identity must be regarded as
another such element. Article 8 protects in addition a right to personal
development, and the right to establish and develop relationships with
other human beings and the outside world. The concept of private life
moreover includes elements relating to a person’s right to their image.6
Thus, the Court has, for example, considered the storing of fingerprints
and DNA samples by the state7 and the publication of photographs of a
3 Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford University Press,
2007), 126.
4 Hatton v. United Kingdom (2003) 37 EHRR 28, para. 96.
5 Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford University Press,
2007), 126.
6 S v. United Kingdom (2009) 48 EHRR 50, para.66 (footnotes omitted).
7 Ibid., para. 67.
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person in her daily life by a magazine8 as falling within the scope of
‘private life’. With regard to sexual autonomy, the Court not only held
that consensual homosexual sex was part of ‘private life’,9 but came close
to saying that homosexual sado-masochistic group sex orgies involving
considerable violence were protected as well.10 Article 8 also protects a
right to access to the information relating to a person’s birth and origin.11
While the ECtHR has not provided a comprehensive definition of the
meaning of ‘private life’, it will still require that the interest in question
be part of ‘private life’, whatever that term exactly means, and thus
the Court will not necessarily accept any interest as falling within the
scope of Article 8; in other words there is still a threshold which needs to
be crossed for an interest to become a right. By way of contrast, the
German Federal Constitutional Court has explicitly given up any thresh-
old to distinguish a mere interest from a constitutional right. As early as
1957 it held that Article 2(1) of the Basic Law, which protects everyone’s
right to freely develop his personality, is to be interpreted as a right to
freedom of action.12 The Court provided various doctrinal reasons for
this result, its main argument being that an earlier draft of Article 2(1)
had read ‘Everyone can do as he pleases’ (‘Jeder kann tun und lassen was er
will’), and that this version had been dropped only for linguistic
reasons.13 The Court affirmed this ruling in various later decisions;
most famously it declared that Article 2(1) of the Basic Law included
the rights to feed pigeons in a park14 and to go riding in the woods.15
It must be noted that the broad understanding of rights does not, of
course, imply that the state is prohibited from interfering with the right
in question. Rather, there is an important conceptual distinction
between an interference with and a violation of a right: an interference
will only amount to a violation if it cannot be justified at the justification
stage. Thus, the broad understanding of rights at the prima facie stage
must be seen in conjunction with the proportionality test which permits
8 von Hannover v. Germany (2005) 40 EHRR 1, para. 53.
9 Dudgeon v. United Kingdom (1982) 4 EHRR 149, paras. 40–41.
10 Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v. United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 39, para. 36. The Court left open the
question of whether the activities in question fell within the scope of Article 8 in their entirety, but
proceeded on the assumption that they did.
11 Odievre v. France (2004) 38 EHRR 43, para. 29.
12 BVerfGE 6, 32 (Elfes).
13 Ibid., 36–7.
14 BVerfGE 54, 143 (Pigeon-Feeding).
15 BVerfGE 80, 137 (Riding in the Woods).
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the limitation of prima facie rights when they are outweighed by a
competing right or public interest. But it is notable that, contrary to
the language used by philosophers, courts are very generous in labelling
an interest a ‘right’, and therefore, again contrary to philosophical usage,
they do not attach much weight to a right simply by virtue of its being a
right. Furthermore, and again in contrast to some philosophical usage,
what is referred to as the ‘right’ is only the prima facie right, not the
definite right. So European lawyers routinely speak of human or consti-
tutional rights to many things which people regularly do not have a
definite right to.16
2. Positive obligations and socio-economic rights
Rights are no longer regarded as exclusively imposing negative obliga-
tions on the state. But while most theorists of rights only started to
reconsider their views on this issue following the growing acceptance
of socio-economic rights (particularly their inclusion in the South African
Constitution), constitutional rights law abandoned the view that rights
impose only negative obligations in the 1970s, when the doctrines of
positive obligations or protective duties became established. The idea is
that the state is under a duty to take steps to prevent harm to the interests
protected by (otherwise negative) rights. Thus, the statemust, as a matter
of constitutional rights law, put in place a system which effectively
protects the people from dangers emanating from other private persons,
such as criminal activities which threaten, for example, life, physical
integrity, or property; and it must also protect them from dangers
which do not have a (direct) human cause, such as natural disasters.
In the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, the idea of positive obligations,
first introduced in the Belgian Linguistics case of 1968,17 is well-
established. In the case of the right to life, it is even supported by the
text of the Convention, which states in Article 2(1) that ‘[e]veryone’s
right to life shall be protected by law’. The Osman case provides a good
16 This approach is sometimes criticized as ‘guilty of “promoting unrealistic expectations” ’ (Webber,
The Negotiable Constitution: On the Limitation of Rights [Cambridge University Press, 2009], 123), but
whether it really is promoting such expectations depends on the way the word ‘right’ is used by the
people. I am not sure that Europeans would be misled in the way Webber envisages; in any case the
charge that they would is unsubstantiated. Furthermore, the linguistic meaning of the terms ‘human
right’ or ‘constitutional right’ as used by the population is likely to change over time, following the
developments in the courts.
17 Case Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages In Education In Belgium (1979–80) 1
EHRR 252, para. 3.
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example of the Court’s approach to this provision. A former teacher of
Ahmet Osman, who was about 15 years old at the time, was obsessed
with him and ultimately wounded the boy and killed his father. The
family alleged that the police had not done enough to protect Osman
and his father from the threat. The Court argued that Article 2(1) ECHR
required not only that the state refrain from killing, but also that it ‘put in
place effective criminal law provisions to deter the commission of
offences against the person backed up by law-enforcement machinery
for the prevention, suppression and sanctioning of breaches of such
provisions’18 and that the provision may additionally ‘imply in certain
well-defined circumstances a positive obligation on the authorities to take
preventive operational measures to protect an individual whose life is at
risk from the criminal acts of another individual’.19
In the case of other rights there is no explicit textual basis supporting
the acknowledgement of positive obligations, but the Court nevertheless
consistently accepts their existence. Of the countless cases, the first von
Hannover judgment provides a good example of the Court’s approach.
Princess Caroline of Monaco had unsuccessfully tried to stop the publi-
cation of certain pictures of her in German gossip magazines; she argued
that the publication violated her right to private life under Article 8 of the
Convention. The Court relied on its well-established case law to grant
the existence of a positive obligation to protect privacy:
The Court reiterates that although the object of Art. 8 is essentially that of
protecting the individual against arbitrary interference by the public
authorities, it does not merely compel the State to abstain from such
interference: in addition to this primarily negative undertaking, there may
be positive obligations inherent in an effective respect for private or
family life. These obligations may involve the adoption of measures
designed to secure respect for private life even in the sphere of the
relations of individuals between themselves. That also applies to the
protection of a person’s picture against abuse by others.20
The legally difficult question in cases involving positive obligations is not
the existence of positive obligations as such; this is well-established case
law. Rather, it is the question of whether the state has done enough to
comply with its obligation (in Osman it had, and in von Hannover it had
18 Osman v. United Kingdom (2000) 29 EHRR 245, para. 115.
19 Ibid. (emphasis added).
20 von Hannover v. Germany (2005) 40 EHRR 1, para. 115.
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not). But that is a separate question concerning the limits of the right,
which does not affect the point to be made here, namely the move away
from an understanding of rights as concerned exclusively with negative
obligations.
The textual basis for the assumption that Convention rights generally
impose positive obligations is weak. In particular, the limitation clauses,
especially of Articles 8 to 11 (the rights to respect for private and family
life, freedom of religion, freedom of expression, and freedom of associ-
ation and assembly), regularly refer to ‘restrictions’, ‘limitations’, and
‘interferences’, which indicates a negative understanding of rights. In its
more recent case law, the Court has tried to support its approach by
reference to Article 1. For example, in a case involving the right to
property (Article 1 of Protocol No. 1) the Court stated:
The essential object of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is to protect a person
against unjustified interference by the State with the peaceful enjoyment
of his or her possessions. However, by virtue of Article 1 of the Conven-
tion, each Contracting Party ‘shall secure to everyone within [its] jurisdic-
tion the rights and freedoms defined in [the] Convention’. The discharge
of this general duty may entail positive obligations inherent in ensuring
the effective exercise of the rights guaranteed by the Convention. In the
context of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, those positive obligations may
require the State to take the measures necessary to protect the right of
property.21
But obviously, the reference to the word ‘secure’ in Article 1 ECHR does
not even come close to a water-tight doctrinal argument for the general
doctrine of positive obligations. The Court was certainly not forced to its
conclusion by such textual subtleties; rather it must have found the idea
of positive obligations attractive as a matter of the theory of rights
underlying the Convention as a whole. But it has never spelt out what
this theory is.
In German constitutional jurisprudence, the idea of protective duties
(Schutzpflichten) was acknowledged for the first time in the first abortion
decision of 1975, where the Federal Constitutional Court held that the
state is under a duty to protect the fetus against the implementation of
the woman’s wish to have an abortion.22 To establish the existence of
the protective duty, the Court referred to the idea of an ‘objective system
21 Broniowski v. Poland (2005) 40 EHRR 495, para. 143.
22 BVerfGE 39, 1 (First Abortion Judgment).
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of values’ set up by the Basic Law, which it had first established in the
Lu¨th decision, discussed below, and to the principle of human dignity
enshrined in Article 1 of the Basic Law.23 In subsequent case law it
dropped the reference to dignity and replaced the phrase ‘objective
system of values’ with the less controversial ‘objective dimension’ of
the basic rights. Today it is uncontroversial in Germany that the doctrine
of protective duties is a general doctrine the application of which is
not limited to certain rights; rather, the state is under a general obliga-
tion to take positive steps towards the protection of the rights of each
person. In practice, however, most cases have been about life and
physical integrity. In the Schleyer case of 1977, the Court held that the
state was under a duty to take adequate steps to rescue Martin Schleyer,
who had been kidnapped by the terrorist Red Army Faction (Rote Armee
Fraktion). The following quotation shows nicely the Court’s basic
approach to the issue.
Art. 2(2)(1) [the right to life] in conjunction with Art. 1(1)(2) Basic Law [the
duty to protect and respect human dignity] obligate the state to protect
every human life. This protective duty is comprehensive. It requires the
state to protect and support each life; this implies mainly to protect it
from illegal interferences by others. All state organs must, according to
their special roles, orient their activities towards this task. As human life
presents a supreme value, this protective duty must be taken particularly
seriously.24
The Court also had to deal with cases relating to the risks or harm
flowing from the use of nuclear energy,25 aircraft noise,26 and the storage
of American chemical weapons.27 It stuck to its earlier jurisprudence and
affirmed the existence of protective duties in all cases.
The South African Constitution explicitly endorses positive duties by
stating in its section 7(2): ‘The state must respect, protect, promote and
fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights.’ Here, ‘respect’ refers to negative duties,
whereas ‘protect’ refers to positive duties. The South African Constitu-
tional Court has affirmed the existence of positive duties in its case law:
It follows that there is a duty imposed on the State and all of its organs not
to perform any act that infringes these rights. In some circumstances there
would also be a positive component which obliges the State and its organs
23 Ibid., 41–2. 24 BVerfGE 46, 160, 164 (Schleyer). 25 BVerfGE 49, 89 (Kalkar I).
26 BVerfGE 56, 54. 27 BVerfGE 77, 170.
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to provide appropriate protection to everyone through laws and struc-
tures designed to afford such protection.28
Furthermore, there is the aforementioned trend towards the acknow-
ledgement of socio-economic rights, which obviously impose positive
duties on the state and thus conflict with the dominant narrative
according to which rights are concerned only with negative obligations.
Socio-economic rights are explicitly included in the South African Con-
stitution, which contains in its sections 26, 27, and 29 rights to housing,
health care, food, water, social security, and education. Of course, it
would be naı¨ve to think that the inclusion of such rights in a constitution
was a sufficient step to resolve poverty. As acknowledged by the South
African Constitutional Court in its first decision on socio-economic
rights, a major practical problem lies in the scarcity of resources,29 and
this cannot be fixed by a constitutional provision. But the important
point for present purposes is that socio-economic rights are acknow-
ledged at the constitutional level, however easily limitable those rights
may be.
While the South African Constitution is explicit about the inclusion of
socio-economic rights, as a matter of substance, similar rights have been
read into other constitutions. The ECtHR, while regularly stressing that
the ECHR ‘does not, as such, guarantee socio-economic rights’,30 has
accepted some socio-economic entitlements mainly through the use of
its doctrine of positive obligations, discussed above, as flowing from
several Convention articles, including Articles 2 (life), 3 (prohibition of
inhuman or degrading treatment), 6 (fair trial), 8 (private and family life),
and 14 (non-discrimination).31 The German Federal Constitutional Court
holds the view that a right to a social minimum follows from Articles 1(1)
and 20(1) of the Basic Law (the principle of human dignity in conjunction
with the principle of the welfare state).32 Thus, in light of the relative
wealth of Germany compared to South Africa, the actual constitutional
entitlements of a poor person will be considerably higher in Germany
28 Carmichele v. Minister of Safety and Security, 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC), para. 44. See also Rail Commuters Action
Group v. Metrorail, 2005 (2) SA 359 (CC), paras. 70–71.
29 Soobramoney v. Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal) (1997) ZACC 17, para. 11.
30 See, for example, Panc¸enko v. Latvia (App No 40772/98), Decision of 28 October 1999, para. 2.
31 For an overview, see Brems, ‘Indirect Protection of Social Rights by the European Court of Human
Rights’, in Barak-Erez and Gross (eds.), Exploring Social Rights (Hart Publishing, 2007), ch. 7.
32 Cf. most recently BVerfG, 1 BvL 1/09 of 9.2.2010 (Hartz IV), para. 133.
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than in South Africa, in spite of the absence of an explicit commitment to
socio-economic rights.
It is remarkable that while positive obligations were first acknow-
ledged by courts in Europe on the basis of constitutional texts which at
face value offered very little support for this view, the new South African
Constitution, as the youngest constitution considered here, explicitly
endorses both positive obligations and socio-economic rights. Both of
these observations—the endorsement in absence of textual support and
the subsequent explicit inclusion in the text of a new constitution—
provide strong indicators that positive duties and socio-economic rights
are indeed part of an emerging global consensus of thinking about
constitutional rights which departs from the dominant narrative in
important ways.
3. Horizontal effect
Constitutional rights are no longer seen as affecting only the relationship
between the citizen and the state; rather, they apply in some way
between private persons as well. For example, the constitutional right
to privacy may protect a person not only against infringements of his
privacy by the state, but also against such infringements by his neigh-
bour, landlord, or employer. The doctrinal tool which achieves this is
called the horizontal effect of rights, where ‘horizontal’ as opposed to
‘vertical’ indicates that rights operate between private persons. It is
possible to see the horizontal effect of rights as a subset of positive
obligations, discussed above: the state is under a positive obligation to
ensure that private persons do not violate other private persons’ rights.
Alternatively, it can be seen as its own category which gives effect to
constitutional rights between private persons.
The first court to acknowledge horizontal effect was the German
Federal Constitutional Court in its famous Lu¨th decision of 1953.33
Erich Lu¨th had called for a boycott of a new film by director Veit Harlan
on the grounds of the latter’s previous involvement with the Nazi
regime. As this call for a boycott had the potential to result in substantial
harm to the financial success of the movie, the producer and his distrib-
uting company obtained a court injunction against Lu¨th. When the
33 BVerfGE 7, 198 (Lu¨th). English translation from the website of the University of Texas School of Law:
http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/transnational/work_new/[copyright: Basil
Markesinis].
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matter came before the Federal Constitutional Court, it had to decide
whether constitutional law, especially the right to freedom of opinion
(Article 5[1] of the Basic Law) had any effect on the private law governing
the relationship between Lu¨th and Harlan (and his distributing com-
pany). The Court first set out the traditional understanding of consti-
tutional rights: ‘There is no doubt that the main purpose of basic rights is
to protect the individual’s sphere of freedom against encroachment by
public power: they are the citizen’s bulwark against the state.’34 But it
then added one of the most famous paragraphs of its history:
But far from being a value-free system the Constitution erects an objective
system of values in its section on basic rights, and thus expresses and
reinforces the validity of the basic rights. This system of values, centring
on the freedom of the human being to develop in society, must apply as a
constitutional axiom throughout the whole legal system: it must direct
and inform legislation, administration, and judicial decision. It naturally
influences private law as well; no rule of private law may conflict with it,
and all such rules must be construed in accordance with its spirit.35
Applying this approach to the facts, it concluded that the lower court had
failed to adequately take into account the right to freedom of opinion.
The idea of an objective system (or order) of values subsequently
became one of the cornerstones of German constitutional jurisprudence.
It was heavily criticized by some academics in particular for its moralistic
undertones; it was feared that the ‘objective order of values’ could easily
lead to a ‘tyranny of values’ which would be relied upon to restrict
individual freedom.36 Presumably in response to these concerns, the
Court later quietly replaced the term with the less controversial idea of
an ‘objective dimension’ of the basic rights. But what exactly the object-
ive system of values or the objective dimension of the basic rights mean
remains something of a mystery to this day. In spite of this open
question, the important lesson to be drawn is that the idea of consti-
tutional rights affecting only the relationship between the citizen and the
state was abandoned as early as 1953 in Germany. The Court affirmed the
doctrine of the horizontal effect of rights in numerous later decisions,
many but not all of which are about freedom of opinion; it is uncontro-
versial that the doctrine is not limited to certain rights but applies across
34 Ibid., 204.
35 Ibid., 205 (emphasis added; references omitted).
36 Denninger, ‘Freiheitsordnung—Wertordnung—Pflichtordnung’, (1975) Juristenzeitung 545, 547.
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the board. For example, the Court decided that a judgment of a lower
court violated the claimant’s personality right (Article 2[1] in conjunction
with Article 1[1] of the Basic Law) by upholding a contractual agreement
between the claimant’s parents and their bank which led to the impos-
ition of heavy debts on the claimant, who was a minor at the time;37 and
it declared a judgment which relied on aesthetic reasons to deny a
Turkish tenant the right to install a dish antenna which would have
enabled him to receive TV programmes from Turkey a violation of his
right to freedom of information.38
In Canada, the question ofwhether constitutional rights operate between
private persons was first considered by the Canadian Supreme Court in the
Dolphin Delivery case in 1986, only four years after the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms had come into force. Dolphin had obtained an
injunction against a union, prohibiting secondary picketing; the union
argued that this was unconstitutional in that it violated their right to
freedom of expression. The important constitutional question was whether
Charter rights applied between private litigants. While the Court in a first
step denied the direct applicability of the Charter when the relevant law
was, as in the case at hand, common law, it then continued by stating that
even though the Charter was not directly applicable, the common law
ought to be developed in a way consistent with Charter values, thus
installing what is technically called weak indirect horizontal effect.39
South Africa is, to my knowledge, the only jurisdiction today which
has explicitly endorsed horizontal effect in its constitution. Section 8(2)
of the South African Constitution states in slightly awkward language:
‘A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and
to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the
right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right.’ This explicit
endorsement of horizontal effect in a young constitution strengthens
further the view proposed here that horizontal effect is by now a well-
established feature of the global model of constitutional rights.
There exist a number of complex and controversial issues about
horizontal effect; in particular, first, the question of whether it is strong
or weak, i.e. whether in a case where it is not possible to reinterpret the
statute in question in line with the requirements of constitutional rights,
37 BVerfGE 72, 155. 38 BVerfGE 90, 27.
39 Retail, Wholesale & Dep’t Store Union v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd. (1986) 2 SCR 573, 605. The subsequent
judgment in Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto (1995) 2 SCR 1170 confirmed this approach and fleshed it
out further.
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the statute is unconstitutional or not; and second, whether horizontal
effect should be direct or indirect, i.e. whether constitutional rights
‘directly’ create rights between private persons or whether they do so
only ‘indirectly’ via the (re-)interpretation of the existing private law.40
The brief overview presented above cannot do justice to the complex-
ities. But it does show that the practice of constitutional rights law no
longer sees rights as exclusively concerned with the relationship between
the individual and the state; rather, in some way, they have an impact on
the relationship between private individuals as well.
4. Balancing and proportionality
Contrary to the dominant narrative, it is not the case that constitutional
rights generally enjoy a special or heightened normative force in legal
practice. While it is true that some rights, such as the right to freedom
from torture and degrading or humiliating treatment or punishment in
Article 3 ECHR, or the right to a fair trial in Article 6 ECHR, are absolute,
most rights—including the rights to life, physical integrity, privacy,
property, freedom of religion, expression, assembly, and association—
can generally be limited in line with the proportionality test, at the core
of which is a balancing exercise where the right is balanced against a
competing right or public interest. Proportionality has become the
central concept in contemporary constitutional rights law, and, in add-
ition to the jurisdictions examined in this book, has been accepted by
virtually every constitutional court in Central and Eastern Europe and is
increasingly employed in Central and South American jurisdictions.41
Different courts use different formulations of what is essentially the
same test. The German Federal Constitutional Court follows a four-
pronged test according to which the policy interfering with the right
must be in pursuit of a legitimate goal; it must be a suitable means of
furthering the achievement of the goal (suitability or rational connec-
tion); it must be necessary in that there must not be a less restrictive
and equally effective alternative (necessity); and it must not impose a
40 On these distinctions and other doctrinal problems involved in the doctrine of horizontal effect cf.
Gardbaum, ‘The “Horizontal Effect” of Constitutional Rights’, (2003–4) 102 Michigan Law Review 387;
Gardbaum, ‘Where the (State) Action is’, (2006) 4 International Journal of Constitutional Law 760; Kumm
and Ferreres Comella, ‘What is so Special about Constitutional Rights in Private Litigation?
A Comparative Analysis of the Function of State Action Requirements and Indirect Effect’, in Sajo´ and
Uitz (eds.), The Constitution in Private Relations (Eleven, 2005).
41 Stone Sweet and Mathews, ‘Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism’, (2008–9) 47
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 72, 112.
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disproportionate burden on the right-holder (balancing or proportion-
ality in the strict sense). The ECtHR demands that the policy further a
legitimate goal and a pressing social need and that it be proportionate to
the achievement of the legitimate goal.42 The Canadian Supreme Court
adopted proportionality analysis, which has become known as the ‘Oakes
test’, in its most famous judgment to date:
First, the measures adopted must be . . . rationally connected to the object-
ive. Second, the means, even if rationally connected to the objective in this
first sense, should impair ‘as little as possible’ the right or freedom in
question . . . Third, there must be a proportionality between the effects of
themeasureswhich are responsible for limiting theCharter right or freedom,
and the objective which has been identified as of ‘sufficient importance’.43
Proportionality is also accepted in South Africa. It was first established in
the Makwanyane case, which was decided under the Interim Constitu-
tion, where the Court held:
The limitation of constitutional rights for a purpose that is reasonable and
necessary in a democratic society involves the weighing up of competing
values, and ultimately an assessment based on proportionality . . . [T]here
is no absolute standard which can be laid down for determining reason-
ableness and necessity. Principles can be established, but the application of
those principles to particular circumstances can only be done on a case by
case basis. This is inherent in the requirement of proportionality, which
calls for the balancing of different interests. In the balancing process, the
relevant considerations will include the nature of the right that is limited,
and its importance to an open and democratic society based on freedom
and equality; the purpose for which the right is limited and the import-
ance of that purpose to such a society; the extent of the limitation, its
efficacy, and particularly where the limitation has to be necessary,
whether the desired ends could reasonably be achieved through other
means less damaging to the right in question.44
The Court later affirmed this approach in its interpretation of the final
Constitution of 1996. Finally, the UK House of Lords (now Supreme
Court) accepted as appropriate the test:
whether: (i) the legislative objective is sufficiently important to justify
limiting a fundamental right; (ii) the measures designed to meet the
42 Norris v. Ireland (1991) 13 EHRR 186, para. 41.
43 R. v. Oakes (1986) 1 SCR 103, para. 70 (emphasis in the original).
44 S. v. Makwanyane (1995) 3 SA 391, para. 104.
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legislative objective are rationally connected to it; and (iii) the means used
to impair the right or freedom are no more than is necessary to accom-
plish the objective.45
In a later decision, it added the fourth stage (the balancing requirement):
‘[the judgment on proportionality] must always involve the striking of a
fair balance between the rights of the individual and the interests of the
community which is inherent in the whole of the Convention.’46
While these tests are all slightly different on the surface, they have in
common a balancing exercise where the right is balanced against the
competing right or public interest, which implies that in contrast to
the dominant narrative, rights do not seem to enjoy any special or
elevated status over public interests, but rather operate on the same
plane as policy considerations. This has been captured in Robert Alexy’s
influential theory of rights as principles which have to be balanced
against competing principles which include policy considerations;47
remarkably, this theory is widely regarded as the best reconstruction of
constitutional rights law available.48
iii. terminological clarifications
1. Global?
The notion of ‘the global’ model of constitutional rights requires explan-
ation. My claim is not that the model introduced in the previous section
is global in the sense that it is accepted in every jurisdiction; rather its
global character flows from the combination of two factors: first, that its
appeal is not limited to certain countries or regions (e.g. Europe); and
second, that it can claim greater appeal on a global scale than any rival
model (such as, in particular, the US model of rights49). Indicators of its
dominant global appeal are, first, the convergence in the doctrinal
arsenal that is employed globally, in particular the ideas of horizontal
effect, positive obligations, and balancing and proportionality, and,
second, the historical links which provide explanations of how ideas
and concepts travelled between jurisdictions. Some of the historical
45 R (Daly) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (2001) UKHL 26, para. 27.
46 Huang and others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (2007) UKHL 11, para. 19.
47 Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Oxford University Press, 2002), ch. 3.
48 Kumm, ‘Constitutional Rights as Principles: On the Structure and Domain of Constitutional Justice’,
(2004) 2 International Journal of Constitutional Law 574, 596.
49 See s. IV on the question of whether the US follows a different model of rights.
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roots of the global model lie in Europe. The doctrine of horizontal effect
was first acknowledged by the German Federal Constitutional Court in
1953; the doctrine of positive obligations was first developed in the late
1960s by the ECtHR and from the mid-1970s by the German Court. The
origin of the principle of proportionality—which is the core concept of
constitutional rights law today—lies in German administrative law50 and
was imported into constitutional law by the Court as early as 1957 in its
famous Pharmacy Judgment (Apothekenurteil).51 These doctrines, and
inseparable from them, a certain model of rights, travelled from Ger-
many and the European level to other European jurisdictions, such as in
particular the ex-communist countries, and to other parts of the world,
such as Canada and South Africa.52 This explains why some authors
loosely speak of the ‘European’ model of rights; but this has to be
understood in the sense of ‘originating from Europe’ as opposed to
‘being endorsed (only) in Europe’; because of its global appeal it is
more precise to speak of the global model of constitutional rights.
2. Constitutional rights
This book mainly considers materials—mostly cases—from the ECtHR,
Germany, the United Kingdom, South Africa and Canada. This selection
may raise questions relating to its usage of the terms ‘constitution’ and
‘constitutional’. I include the ECHR here in spite of the fact that it is
technically not a constitution but an international treaty; however, the
ECtHR performs a review function very similar to that of the highest
domestic courts, the main difference arguably being a somewhat relaxed
intensity of review. Furthermore, I will generally refer to ‘constitutional’
rights in this book, a term which has some advantages over its alterna-
tives, ‘human’ or ‘fundamental’ rights, in that it makes clear that we are
concerned with legal (often justiciable) rights of a certain elevated status
over that of ordinary legislation. This includes the rights of the ECHR
and also the rights protected under weak systems of judicial review such
as the one in the United Kingdom. Furthermore, I will refer to the courts
adjudicating upon constitutional rights (in the sense just explained) as
50 Cf. Stone Sweet and Mathews, ‘Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism’, (2008–9) 47
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 72, 97; Cohen-Eliya and Porat, ‘American Balancing and German
Proportionality: The Historical Origins’, (2010) 8 International Journal of Constitutional Law 263, 271.
51 BVerfGE 7, 377 (Pharmacy Judgment).
52 Stone Sweet and Mathews, ‘Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism’, (2008–9) 47
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 72, 112–31.
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‘constitutional’ courts, independently of whether they are technically
supreme courts, constitutional courts, or—as in the case of the ECtHR—
international courts.
iv. the us: an outlier?
This book excludes US jurisprudence from the set of materials which it
seeks to reconstruct. The reason for this lies not in any claim to the effect
that the US follows a model of rights which is different from that of the
rest of the world; the book leaves this issue open. Rather it is that at this
particular point of its history, US practice is on the surface different
enough from the global model to justify leaving it aside, in order to
avoid the long, complicated and controversial argument which would
inevitably be needed to justify its inclusion and which would only
distract from the book’s main claims.
US constitutional rights law can be regarded as differing from that of
the rest of the world in several respects. Most obviously, it is different
with regard to the outcomes that it produces: many substantive views of
the US Supreme Court about what rights do or do not require are not
shared by other courts, for example on issues relating to abortion, hate
or other offensive speech, or gun control, to name a few. But more
important in the present context is that it seems, at least on the surface,
that the US follows a structurally different understanding of rights which
seems much closer to the dominant narrative. First, there is no rights
inflation in the US Supreme Court, or at least not to the same extent as in
Europe: the Court will only accept a liberty interest as a right if it can be
shown to be ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’;53 its
reason for this caution is that ‘[b]y extending constitutional protection to
an asserted right or liberty interest, we, to a great extent, place the
matter outside the arena of public debate and legislative action. We must
therefore “exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new
ground in this field”’.54 Second, there is no general acknowledgement of
horizontal effect; rather, constitutional rights will only apply when there
is ‘state action’.55 Third, there is no endorsement of positive duties and
53 See, for example,Washington v. Glucksberg (1997) 521 U.S. 702, 720.
54 Ibid.
55 For an overview, see Barendt, ‘The United States and Canada: State Action, Constitutional Rights and
Private Actors’, in Oliver and Fedtke (eds.), Human Rights and the Private Sphere (Routledge-Cavendish,
2007), 399.
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certainly none of socio-economic rights. The DeShaney case illustrates
this approach: the petitioner was a child who was subjected to a series of
beatings by his father until he eventually suffered permanent, serious
brain damage. He and his mother argued that the state had violated his
constitutional rights by failing to protect him from his father. The
Supreme Court, however, held that the Fourteenth Amendment,
which states that ‘no State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law’, was not violated. It relied on
textual and historical reasons to support this conclusion, arguing that the
clause was phrased as a limitation on the state’s power to act, not as a
guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security, and that its
history showed its purpose to be the prevention of government abusing
its power or employing it as an instrument of oppression. ‘Its purpose
was to protect the people from the State, not to ensure that the State
protected them from each other. The Framers were content to leave the
extent of governmental obligation in the latter area to the democratic
political process.’56 This understanding of constitutional rights thus
places the US Supreme Court in diametrical contrast to the ECtHR,
which would have applied its general doctrine of positive obligations and
held that the right to life and the right to private life (into which the
Court reads a right to physical integrity) place obligations on the state to
protect people’s lives and physical integrity from violations by third
parties. Finally, US constitutional law has not subscribed to the propor-
tionality test to determine the permissible limitations of rights, but uses a
variety of standards, including the strict scrutiny test which demands
that a law interfering with a fundamental right must serve a compelling
government interest and be narrowly tailored to the achievement of that
interest. According to common wisdom, this requirement is harder to
fulfil than proportionality; as the saying goes, strict scrutiny is ‘“strict” in
theory and fatal in fact’.57
It must be noted that all the above observations on the current state of
US law are controversial; and it would seem possible to construct an
argument to the effect that upon closer inspection the US model of rights
is not far removed from the global model. With regard to rights infla-
tion, it is arguable that the rational basis test which the US Supreme
56 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services (1989) 489 U.S. 189, 196.
57 This famous phrase was coined by Gunther, ‘The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection’, (1972) 86 Harvard Law
Review 1, 8.
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Court applies to interests not deemed fundamental does in substance
award those interests a protection similar to the protection offered to
trivial interests under, for example, the German or European
approaches, albeit without labelling those interests as ‘rights’. With
regard to horizontal effect, the simple reference to the ‘state action’
doctrine raises the question of what counts as state action: under the
broadest possible understanding, the creation of any (private law) statute
or common law doctrine amounts to state action, from which it follows
that there is indeed state action in every legal dispute; and furthermore,
court decisions adjudicating claims between private individuals can
always be constructed as involving state action.58 At times the Supreme
Court has come close to taking this view,59 which, taken seriously,
would in substance lead to a broad acknowledgement of horizontal
effect via the state action doctrine. Thus, referral to the requirement of
‘state action’ does not resolve the problem of whether and to what
extent constitutional rights have an impact on the legal relationship
between private parties. With regard to the absence of positive obliga-
tions, the DeShaney judgment has been sharply criticized as relying on a
mistaken interpretation of the US constitution.60 And finally, with regard
to balancing and proportionality, even within the US Supreme Court,
Justice Breyer has shown sympathies for the European approaches on
balancing and proportionality and would prefer to see those approaches
used more widely within the interpretation of the US Bill of Rights.61
Furthermore, it is arguable that the current tiered scrutiny (strict and
intermediate scrutiny; rational basis review) amounts in substance to
something similar to proportionality analysis.
Thus, it is certainly a possibility that upon deeper analysis it turns out
that US practice, too, is best explained by the global model and the
reconstructive theory developed in this book. Furthermore, it remains of
course true that US constitutional rights law is a part of a Western liberal
tradition of rights discourse and that for this reason examples and cases
drawn from it will be useful for the analysis of specific issues even if its
58 Kumm and Ferreres Comella, ‘What is so Special about Constitutional Rights in Private Litigation?
A Comparative Analysis of the Function of State Action Requirements and Indirect Effect’, in Sajo´ and
Uitz (eds.), The Constitution in Private Relations (Eleven, 2005).
59 Shelley v. Kramer (1948) 334 U.S. 1.
60 Strauss, ‘Due Process, Government Inaction, and Private Wrongs’, (1989) Supreme Court Review 53.
61 District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) 128 S.Ct. 2783, 2852 (Breyer J, dissenting). For an insightful
discussion, cf. Cohen-Eliya and Porat, ‘The Hidden Foreign Law Debate in Heller: The Proportionality
Approach in American Constitutional Law’, (2009) 46 San Diego Law Review 367.
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doctrinal structure arguably differs from the global model. Therefore
this book will occasionally rely on US cases to illustrate a point. But for
the reasons given, a comprehensive analysis of how US law relates to the
global model is beyond the scope of this book.
It is an interesting point to note that many of the leading philosophers
of rights—Ronald Dworkin, Robert Nozick, James Griffin and others—
are Americans; their theories may be influenced by or, as in Dworkin’s
case, reconstructions of the US practice which, as explained, at least on
the surface seems to be much closer to the dominant narrative. If so, then
this makes even clearer the need for a theory of rights which is developed
against the backdrop of the global model of constitutional rights.
v. the reconstructive approach
The theory proposed in this book is reconstructive, which means that it is a
theory of the practice of constitutional rights law around the world (‘the
practice’) and especially those features of the practice which I summar-
ized under the label of ‘the global model of constitutional rights’. This can
be contrasted with what we might call a ‘philosophical’ theory of consti-
tutional rights which is insensitive to the practice. A philosophical theory
will aim at providing the morally best account of constitutional rights
while ignoring the question of the extent to which this account fits the
practice. When the practice departs from the philosophical theory then
this is for the philosophical theory a reason for regret only insofar as the
practice is deficient; but it does not affect the validity of the philosophical
theory. The reconstructive theory, by way of contrast, aims at providing
a theory which, like the philosophical theory, is morally coherent, but
unlike it, need not be the morally best (‘the one right’) theory, where
‘morally best’ is understood as morally best independently of the practice.
Of the several morally coherent theories, the reconstructive theory will
pick the one which fits the practice better than any other coherent theory.
Thus, the reconstructive theory is sensitive to both moral value and the
practice it seeks to reconstruct; it is, in Ronald Dworkin’s terminology, an
interpretive theory.62
There are two reasons why this book chooses the reconstructive
approach. First, the practice of constitutional rights adjudication around
the world provides scholars with a wealth of case law and doctrines
produced by judges who often deal with questions of constitutional
62 On interpretivism see Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Hart Publishing, 1986), ch. 2.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 28/9/2012, SPi
20 B The Global Model of Constitutional Rights
rights on a daily basis and accumulate a practical expertise in this area
which philosophers cannot hope to match. It would simply be impru-
dent to ignore this wealth of materials and experience when developing
a theory of rights. Second, the extraordinary amount of political power
exercised by constitutional courts raises particularly urgent questions of
legitimacy and requires an assessment of the moral justifiability of the
practice; and for this the reconstructive account can be used.
The reconstructive theory can be employed for two further purposes.
First, it can be used to assess specific aspects of the practice; where the
practice departs from the reconstructive theory, this particular aspect of the
practice is, all things being equal, a mistake which should be corrected. For
example, if the reconstructive account holds that the practice is best
reconstructed as excluding moralism, then we can conclude that those
cases in which moralism nevertheless features are, all things being equal,
mistakes and should have been decided differently. Second, one can assess
the reconstructive account in light of a philosophical account and use the
philosophical account to criticize the reconstructive one and recommend
reform. However, for any philosophical theory to convincingly claim the
need for reform of the practice, it must first provide the best possible
understanding of the practice; otherwise the philosophical account risks
fighting against a distorted account of the practice or a straw man.
There are two kinds of reconstructive theories. The first can be called
moral reconstruction; this is the kind of theory which I have outlined
above and which will be proposed in this book. It aims at finding moral
value in a practice: something which makes it worth continuing with
that practice. It is of course possible that there is no such moral value, in
which case this would have to be acknowledged by adopting the per-
spective of what Dworkin calls the internal sceptic;63 the consequence is
that the practice ought to be discontinued. The second kind of recon-
struction is morally neutral; we might call it zeitgeist reconstruction.
Rather than aiming at identifying moral merit it aims at reconstructing
the practice in a way which shows the zeitgeist predominant in shaping
the practice. Zeitgeist reconstruction is a valid scholarly enterprise and
can be important for, in particular, historical and sociological purposes.
Two examples will show the difference between the two kinds of
reconstruction. We might be interested in a zeitgeist reconstruction of
Nazi law. So we would look at the practice of Nazi law and try to identify
63 Ibid., 78–9.
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important themes in it; and we would find one important theme which is
the idea of the racial superiority of Aryans over Jews. So we might say
that one aspect of our zeitgeist reconstruction of Nazi law is this pre-
sumed superiority. By way of contrast, if we had engaged in a moral
reconstruction of Nazi law, we could not have held that the idea of a
superiority of Aryans over Jews was a valid reconstruction: it lacks moral
value; or in other words, it is not a principle but a falsity. So a moral
reconstruction of Nazi law would look very different from a zeitgeist
reconstruction. The second example is closer to contemporary consti-
tutional rights law. Suppose that a look at the practice shows that
sometimes the practice rejects moralism and sometimes it approves of
moralism. For example, moralism towards homosexuals is no longer
regarded as acceptable today by the courts, whereas 50 years ago it
clearly was; but recently the German Federal Constitutional Court
regarded moralism towards people engaging in incest as acceptable.64
Someone engaging in moral reconstruction must give a morally coher-
ent account of the legitimacy of moralism which also fits the practice.
She could not just argue that the correct moral reconstruction held that
moralism was acceptable when directed against whoever is the unpopu-
lar group of the day: that blatantly lacks moral coherence because the
mere fact that a group is unpopular does not justify limiting this group’s
freedom. But it might be a very good zeitgeist reconstruction: it might be
the case that the zeitgeist in Western societies is such that it is regarded as
permissible to engage in moralism towards a group only if that group is
really unpopular. So, again, two persons engaging in reconstructive
enterprises might come up with very different reconstructive accounts
depending on what the goal of their reconstruction is. Since the aim of
this book is to assess the moral legitimacy of the practice it seeks to
reconstruct, it must engage in a moral reconstruction.
vi. a summary
The book will rely on the four features of the global model of consti-
tutional rights presented in section II in order to develop its theory of
rights: first, rights inflation and the broad understanding of (prima facie)
rights, including a right to privacy which protects almost all, at least all
non-trivial, interests; second, the existence of positive obligations and the
64 BVerfGE 120, 224, 248 (referring to a ‘sense of wrongness [Unrechtsbewusstsein] anchored in society’ as
reinforcing the reasons supporting the prohibition).
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growing acceptance of socio-economic rights; third, the acknowledge-
ment of horizontal effect; and fourth, the use of the doctrines of balan-
cing and proportionality. My claim is that on the basis of this set of
materials it is possible to construct a theory of constitutional rights
which fits these materials and is morally coherent. To this end, the
structure of this book will reflect the unanimous practice of courts in
distinguishing between the prima facie stage of rights and the justifica-
tion stage.
In Chapters 2–4, the book develops a theory of the scope of prima
facie rights which makes sense of the broad understanding of rights,
horizontal effect, positive obligations, and socio-economic rights.
Chapter 2 (‘Negative and Positive Freedom’) argues that the value
protected by constitutional rights must be positive freedom, or personal
autonomy: in particular the doctrines of positive obligations and horizon-
tal effect and the increasing acceptance of socio-economic rights indicate
that the point of rights is to enable people to live their lives autono-
mously, as opposed to disabling or limiting the government in certain
ways.
Chapter 3 (‘Two Conceptions of Autonomy’) discusses two compet-
ing conceptions of personal autonomy which I term the excluded reasons
conception and the protected interests conception. The excluded reasons
conception—related in particular to Dworkinian theories of rights—
holds that in order to respect a person’s autonomy, the state must not
rely on certain (excluded) reasons in its treatment of him, in particular
moralistic or paternalistic reasons or reasons based on the idea that some
people are worth less than others. The chapter argues that while this is a
coherent and intuitively appealing conception of autonomy, it cannot
explain the broad scope of (prima facie) rights accepted today. The
second and preferable conception of autonomy—the protected interests
conception—focuses directly on the actions and personal resources
which are important for the purpose of leading an autonomous life.
For example, it recognizes the importance for autonomous persons of
being able to choose one’s intimate partners, utter one’s political views,
and control what happens to one’s body, and takes the importance of
these interests as the reason for protecting them. It is then possible to
assess the weight of a specific autonomy interest with reference to its
importance from the perspective of the self-conception of the agent. This
approach is related but preferable to similar concepts used by courts
and philosophers, such as the idea of developing one’s personality,
which is widely used in European human rights law, James Griffin’s
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idea of living one’s conception of a worthwhile life, or the idea of
self-realization. The chapter demonstrates that the protected interests
conception is successful and superior to the excluded reasons conception
in explaining the broad scope of rights under the global model.
Chapter 4 (‘The Right to Autonomy’) proposes a comprehensive
conception of (prima facie) rights. It demonstrates that it is coherent to
accept rights to whatever is in the interest of the autonomy of a person,
including socio-economic rights (which protect the preconditions of
autonomy) and rights to engage in trivial activities (such as pursuing
one’s hobbies) and even immoral and harmful activities (such as
murder). It thus concludes that the almost unanimously held view that
there is a threshold which separates interests from rights should be given
up. The point and purpose of constitutional rights under the global
model is thus not to single out certain especially important interests
for heightened protection but rather to ensure that all autonomy inter-
ests of a person are adequately protected at all times. The broad under-
standing of prima facie rights is simply a tool which ensures that all
autonomy interests survive the prima facie stage in order to assess the
adequacy of their protection at the justification stage, using, in particular,
the proportionality test.
In the subsequent three chapters, Chapters 5–7, the book develops a
theory of the justification stage, focussing on the core doctrinal tools
used at that stage, namely balancing and the principle of proportionality.
Chapter 5 (‘Towards a Theory of Balancing and Proportionality: The
Point and Purpose of Judicial Review’) starts from the premise that in
order to develop a substantive moral theory of balancing and propor-
tionality, we first need an account of the point and purpose of judicial
review under the global model. This account must integrate the recon-
structive theory of rights as it has emerged in the previous chapters with
attractive accounts of the values of democracy and the separation of
powers. Having established in Chapter 4 that constitutional rights com-
prehensively protect a person’s autonomy, this chapter goes one step
further and argues that not only rights but also (almost all) policies are
oriented towards autonomy. It follows that constitutional rights and
policy-making are concerned with the same subject-matter, namely the
specification of the spheres of autonomy of equal citizens. This raises a
problem for the legitimacy of judicial review because it seems to imply
that there is no room left for democratic decision-making. Relying on a
reinterpretation of Mattias Kumm’s work, the chapter proposes a solu-
tion to this problem by arguing that for a policy to be constitutionally
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legitimate and democratic properly understood, it must represent a
reasonable specification of the spheres of autonomy of equal citizens, as
opposed to the one correct specification. The chapter further integrates
this result with the value of the separation of powers by arguing that
even if one accepted the controversial proposition that considerations
relating to institutional competence are the key to a proper appreciation
of that value, no objection to judicial review would arise because it is
plausible to assume that courts will be capable of assessing constitutional
legitimacy in the specific sense just described.
The following two chapters build on these conclusions to develop an
account of balancing and proportionality. Chapter 6 (‘Balancing’) pre-
sents the operative heart of the doctrine proposed in this book: a theory
of personal autonomy under conditions of conflict. When there is such
conflict between the autonomy interests of one person with the auton-
omy interests of another person, constitutional law recommends that
the competing autonomy interests are to be ‘balanced’. The chapter first
clarifies the various possible meanings of this idea by presenting four
concepts of balancing: balancing as autonomy maximization, interest
balancing, formal balancing, and balancing as reasoning. It argues, nega-
tively, that equating, without further argument, balancing with conse-
quentialist reasoning or mechanical ways of quantification would be
misguided; at the most general level, the doctrine of balancing, properly
understood, simply refers to the need to resolve a conflict of autonomy
interests in line with sound moral arguments (balancing as reasoning).
Positively, the chapter proposes a set of moral principles to adequately
deal with such conflicts, illustrating this with analyses of a broad range of
important constitutional rights cases relating to issues including abor-
tion, hate speech, religious drug use, euthanasia, and many others. Thus,
it explores the considerable complexity that hides under the convenient
doctrinal label of ‘balancing’ and develops a workable theory of how this
balancing ought to be conducted in the resolution of actual cases.
The final chapter (‘Proportionality’) integrates the results of the
previous chapters into a comprehensive theory of proportionality. It
argues that the principle of proportionality is a tool for the structured
resolution of conflicts of autonomy interests. Each of the four stages of
the proportionality test (legitimate goal; suitability or rational connec-
tion; necessity; balancing or proportionality in the strict sense) has its
own role to play in this regard. The purpose of the legitimate goal stage
is to exclude goals which, while sometimes autonomy-related, must not
be accorded any weight: in particular moralistic or impermissibly
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paternalistic goals. The point of the suitability stage is to establish the
extent to which there is a genuine conflict between the two autonomy
interests at stake. The necessity stage deals with alternative policies
which are less restrictive of the right. At the balancing stage the conflict
is ultimately resolved, using the framework developed in Chapter 6. In
assessing the balance, courts grant the original decision-maker what in
Europe is called a ‘margin of appreciation’; other courts do the same
under different terminologies. This margin of appreciation incorporates
the reasonableness requirement proposed in Chapter 5 into constitu-
tional rights law: a policy will be regarded as constitutionally legitimate
if it falls within the margin of appreciation of the elected branches, i.e. if
it resolves a conflict of autonomy interests in a way which is reasonable
(as opposed to correct). Thus, the principle of proportionality, properly
applied, guides judges through the reasoning process as to whether a
policy is constitutionally legitimate.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 28/9/2012, SPi
26 B The Global Model of Constitutional Rights
